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Abstract: We present a mixed-integer, linear programming model for determining 
optimal interconnection locations using a cost minimisation approach. Optimal 
interconnection and capacity investment decisions are determined under various 
targets for renewable penetration. The model is applied to a test system for eight 
countries in Northern Europe. It is found that considerations on the supply side 
dominate demand side considerations when determining optimal interconnection 
investment. Interconnection is found to be most valuable when targets for 
renewable electricity are set for the whole system, rather than for different regions 
within the system. 
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Optimal interconnection and renewable targets in North-West Europe 
 
Introduction 
Cross-border electricity transmission, ie interconnection, is often presented as a panacea for 
various challenges that surface in electricity systems. Traditionally, electricity systems 
evolved in an isolated manner, frequently with one dominant player for generation, supply 
and transmission. As liberalisation of electricity markets has become a policy aim in many 
jurisdictions, interconnection has been frequently proposed as the primary, if not only, 
means of increasing market integration across borders and mitigating market power (Gilbert 
et al., 2004; Brunekreeft et al.; 2004, Neuhoff et al., 2005). As concerns over climate change 
and energy supply security lead to investment in renewable electricity, interconnection is 
proposed as a means of facilitating such investment by enabling a country or region with a 
significant level of variable renewable generation to export their surplus electricity and 
import when supply is low (De Jonghe et al.; 2011, EWIS, 2010; EWITS, 2011; Ostergaard, 
2003). Interconnection between regions with a diverse demand profile could also serve to 
bring about a reduction in the range of the total demand curve. This can reduce generation 
costs by facilitating a proportional increase in cheaper inflexible generation plant, such as 
coal and nuclear, and reducing dependence on flexible high-cost peaking plant. Indeed, this 
is the rationale behind large scale power systems – that by meeting demand at an aggregate 
level, larger and cheaper generation plant can be built which can meet large portions of 
demand at lower cost. Thus the potential for interconnection to smooth both the supply and 
demand of electricity is seen as one of the major reasons for interconnection investment. 
A single integrated EU market for electricity is a stated aim of the European Union (EC, 
1996). An increase in renewable energy is also a specific aim of the European Commission 
with targets in place which aim to source twenty per cent of electricity from renewable 
sources by 2020 (EC, 2009). Increased levels of electricity transmission are recommended by 
the Directive in order to achieve both of these objectives. The Commission also cites the 
‘development of less-favoured regions of the Community’ as a means of justifying increased 
investment in transmission (EC, 2009b). 
While Directive 2009/28/EC specifies that 20% of the EU’s gross final energy consumption is 
to be sourced from renewable energy by 2020, this is to be achieved by imposing specific 
national targets for each individual country within the EU. Aune et al. (2011) find that a 
policy of differentiated national targets is not a cost-effective way to reach a certain 
renewable share, even if there is a market for renewable certificates. However they do not 
consider the effect of increased interconnection on meeting renewable targets. The 
question of differentiated targets for individual regions as opposed to a global target is of 
relevance to other jurisdictions such as the USA, where many states have individual targets 
for renewable generation (Wiser and Bolinger, 2011).  
Much of the literature on interconnection considers the effect of building a specific 
interconnector between two countries or between two regions within a country. Examples 
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include Kanagawa and Nakata (2006), who use the META-Net economic modelling system to 
conclude that the utilisation of interconnection between Japan and Korea is largely 
determined by the generation plant mix and emissions or by nuclear energy policy. Schroder 
et al. (2010) use the WILMAR model to examine the implications of interconnecting Sweden, 
Germany and Denmark while incorporating an offshore wind farm in the North Sea and the 
Baltic Sea. Maluguzzi Valeri (2009) examines interconnection between Great Britain and 
Ireland and concludes that the socially optimal level of interconnection is higher than the 
level of interconnection likely to be delivered by market forces. This is due to the fact that 
interconnection tends to harmonise prices in the two connected markets, and so 
interconnection erodes its own value as an investment opportunity. 
Some of the more general work in this area studies the economic impacts of interconnection 
in terms of regulator and generator behaviour, and implications for markets. Brunekreeft et 
al. (2004) concludes that deep connection charging as well as Locational Marginal Pricing 
(LMP) may be required to signal efficient investment locations, and that merchant 
interconnection, while raising new regulatory issues, may still be a suitable means of 
increasing interconnection. Neuhoff and Newbery (2005) find that integrated electricity 
markets lead to the highest social welfare, but consumer prices may increase in the short 
run. Brunekreeft (2004) addresses the regulatory issues pertaining to the regulation of 
merchant interconnection and concludes that competition law is sufficient to justify 
refraining from sector-specific arrangements. The optimal ownership and operation of 
interconnectors is also a well-developed strand in the literature. Brunekreeft and Newbery 
(2006) find that a regulatory decision to prohibit capacity withholding decreases welfare if 
the capacity withholding is due to uncertainty and demand growth, and increases welfare if 
the withholding is due to pre-emptive investment. Kristiansen and Rosellow (2006) propose 
a mechanism to incentivise investment in merchant transmission using long-term financial 
transmission rights (FTRs). Buijs et al. (2007) claim that underinvestment in transmission in 
Europe is due to regulatory failures and that merchant interconnectors provide an 
acceptable alternative.  
Interconnection also features in some generation resource planning models. De Jonghe et al. 
(2011) use a linear programming model to determine the optimal electricity plant mix with a 
high level of wind generation. They include existing interconnection in the model but do not 
examine the effects of adding more interconnection. Neuhoff (2008) includes wind variation 
and transmission constraints in an expanded investment-planning model, and calculates the 
additional cost savings from expansions in transmission capacity. Most studies in this area, 
however, consider interconnection levels as an exogenous variable and do not consider the 
effects of constructing new interconnection. 
Unsihuay-Vila et al. (2011) use a multi-objective model to identify optimal generation and 
interconnection investments while attempting to find the best compromise between three 
objectives: minimise cost, minimise greenhouse gases and maximise diversification of the 
electricity generation mix. Their model is one of the few to include transmission as an 
endogenous variable. However, demand is included as three load-blocks of low, medium and 
peak demand over the planning horizon, and as such does not capture the variable nature of 
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demand or renewable generation, which may constitute a major component of 
interconnector value. 
There has been little investigation of methods for determining optimal locations for specific 
interconnectors, other than in specific case studies examining the construction of a 
particular interconnector such as those mentioned above (Kanagawa and Nakata, (2006); 
Schroder et al., (2010); Malaguzzi Valeri (2009)). Here we present a model which includes 
interconnector locations as an endogenous variable, thus solving for optimal 
interconnection in an objective manner.  
The model determines the optimal amount of investment in new generation capacity as well 
as optimal investment in interconnection. As such, the model captures the interdependent 
nature of generation capacity and interconnection rather than attempting to solely identify 
optimal interconnection investment for a given generation portfolio. This is accomplished by 
means of an iterative approach in which a linear program and then a mixed integer program 
are run for each year under investigation, with the linear program determining the optimal 
generation capacity and the mixed integer program determining optimal interconnection 
investment. 
The model captures the increased capacity to balance supply and demand afforded by 
interconnection by including demand and renewable generation at an hourly resolution. The 
model can be used to examine the interchangeable nature of investment in generation 
capacity or interconnection. By including constraints in the model which require certain 
proportions of electricity generation to come from renewable sources, the complementary 
nature, if any, of interconnection and variable renewable generation can also be 
investigated. This is done by applying the model to a test system of eight Northern European 
countries from the year 2011 to the year 2030. Differentiated renewable targets for each 
country and a global renewable target are imposed, and the various effects on 
interconnection are identified. The interplay between interconnection and renewable 
certificate markets can also be examined by the model. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 outlines the test 
system to which the model was applied. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 discusses 
the insights and implications of the results. Section 6 concludes. 
2 Model 
The model seeks to meet the electricity demand for all regions modelled while minimising 
total costs. As such a social planner is assumed, whereby total costs across all regions is 
minimised rather than each country minimising its own individual costs. This is in contrast to 
the current approach in which each country or region within a country has a separate 
Transmission System Operator (TSO), or in some cases more than one TSO, and one 
regulator which take responsibility for electricity provision. The model therefore provides 
particularly useful insight into whether decisions taken by separate countries (possibly in 
response to EU policy directives) which minimise costs within a particular region may 
contribute to an overall increase in costs. 
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Ideally the model would optimise both the location and the capacity of new interconnection 
investment. However, this would introduce a nonlinearity which would render the problem 
too computationally intensive. For this reason it is necessary to select a default 
interconnector size and to assume that any interconnection built is of this fixed capacity. 
The model meets electricity demand by dispatching available generation capacity while 
minimising total costs arising from both interconnection investment and generation 
investment over the course of one planning horizon. An iterative approach is taken (see 
Figure 1). In the first step of the iterative process a Capacity Optimisation Module is run. The 
Capacity Optimisation Module is a linear program as all variables are continuous and enter 
the objective function in a linear manner. The inputs include the existing interconnection 
portfolio between the regions and the existing generation portfolio for each region. The 
demand in each region is given as a parameter at an hourly resolution. The Capacity 
Optimisation Module has the option of building new generation capacity in any given region 
while determining the optimal dispatch of the generation assets and the optimal utilisation 
of the existing interconnectors. The model determines the optimal dispatch of the total 
generation capacity portfolio, given by the existing generation assets as well as any new 
generation assets solved for by the model. 
In the second step of the iterative process an Interconnection Optimisation Module is run. 
The Interconnection Optimisation Module is a mixed integer program as the decision 
variable which determines whether to build interconnection between two regions is an 
integer quantity. The inputs of the Module include the generation portfolio arrived at in the 
first step along with the existing interconnection portfolio. The model does not, therefore, 
model retirements of generation or interconnection assets. The Module determines the 
optimal dispatch of the generation plant and the optimal operation of the existing 
interconnection, as does the Capacity Optimisation Module. The Module also has an option 
to build interconnection between any two regions, in which case it determines the optimal 
operation of the total interconnection portfolio, given by the existing interconnection 
capacity and the new interconnection capacity arrived at by the model. 
If interconnection is built in the Interconnection Optimisation Module, the portfolio of 
existing interconnection which was given as an input to the Capacity Optimisation Module is 
updated to include this new interconnection. The Capacity Optimisation Module is then 
rerun using the original portfolio of existing generation assets and the new interconnection 
portfolio. The generation capacity portfolio arrived at is then given as a parameter to the 
Interconnection Optimisation Module which is rerun using the original existing 
interconnection portfolio. If the new interconnection investments arrived at differ from 
those arrived at in the first step, the new interconnection portfolio arrived at is reintroduced 
to the Capacity Optimisation Module and the process is repeated. When the Interconnection 
Optimisation Module arrives at the same interconnection investments as in the previous 
iteration, the model terminates for that planning horizon and carries the generation and 
interconnection portfolios arrived at on to the next planning horizon. 
The objective functions and constraints for each Module are outlined below. 
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2.1 Cost function 
Total costs are broken down below into several components.  
The first component considered is the cost of building generation capacity, given by the 
following expression: 
�𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑔,𝑟 ∗ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑔
𝑔,𝑟 … (1) 
where capacity stands for capacity in MW of generation technology g in region r. The 
generation technologies considered are coal, nuclear, wind and gas. 
The second component of total costs is the cost of interconnection between two regions and 
is given below as expression (2): 
�𝑖𝑐𝑟,𝑟 ∗ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟,𝑟 ∗ 𝑖𝑐_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑟
… (2) 
where ic  is the inter quantity denoting interconnection between two regions. The distance 
between each region and itself is set to zero which ensures there is no cost to 
interconnecting within a particular region. 
The third component of total costs is the value of lost load (VOLL) term. This term is included 
as a penalty for failing to meet all the demand while avoiding a binding constraint requiring 
all demand to be met. The term is given below as expression (3): 
�� 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑑 −  𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑔,𝑟,𝑟,𝑡
𝑔,𝑟,𝑡 � ∗ 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐿… (3) 
While the purpose of the model is to determine optimal investment in interconnection and 
generation capacity, these investments are influenced by the economic dispatch of 
generation units. Thus the cost function must also include the costs of generating from 
dispatchable generation, given by equation (4) below. 
� 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑔 ∗
𝑔,𝑟,𝑟,𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑔,𝑟,𝑟,𝑡 … (4) 
Figure (1) gives the objective functions for both the Capacity Optimisation Module and 
Interconnection Optimisation Module, along with a representation of the model process for 
each time horizon. 
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Figure 1: Interconnection investment model 
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2.2 Constraints 
The first constraint in the model specifies the maximum generation of each type of 
generation given by the capacity of each type of generation. The minimum generation for 
each generation type is assumed to be zero, ie unit commitment of individual units is not 
modelled: 
�𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑔,𝑟,𝑟,𝑡 ≤ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑔,𝑟
𝑟
 ∀ 𝑡… (5) 
A wind capacity constraint is included separately as wind generation is determined by a time 
series given by wind_profile, the wind available in each region at time t: 
�𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ_𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑟,𝑟,𝑡 ≤ 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑡,𝑟 ∗  𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑_𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑔,𝑟
𝑟
 ∀ 𝑡… (6) 
Expression (7) below is the constraint representing interconnector capacity: 
�𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑔,𝑟,𝑟,𝑡
𝑔
+  𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ_𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑟,𝑟,𝑡 ≤ 𝑖𝑐𝑟,𝑟 ∗ 𝑖𝑐_𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑖𝑐_𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟,𝑟 ∀𝑡… (7) 
Figure (1) outlines the iterative process that is used to determine optimal generation and 
interconnection capacity for each year, with an explanation given as to whether each term is 
a variable or a parameter. 
2.3 Limitations of the model 
The model considers each region to be a copper plate, ie, transmission within regions is not 
modelled. 
The model does not impose minimum operation constraints, start-up costs or ramping costs 
and constraints on the conventional generation sources. This means that many of the 
operational benefits of interconnection, such as the increased operational flexibility 
available to system operators, are not captured by the model. Market effects such as a 
reduction in market power are also not examined. The omission of such benefits may lead 
the model to underestimate the value of interconnection. 
The model does not provide an analysis of reliability issues which arise as a result of extreme 
events of the system. These include failures of thermal plant or transmission lines, and very 
high or low wind events. The model assumes generators and transmission are reliable, and 
models wind output deterministically. Modelling wind stochastically would considerably 
increase computational time (Tuohy et al., 2009). As such the model is likely to 
underestimate the cost of wind generation. 
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3 Test system 
3.1 Endogenous variables 
The model was applied to a case study for eight countries in northern Europe: Ireland, Great 
Britain, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium, Netherlands and West Denmark. Hourly 
demand data for these eight northern European countries from 2010 was obtained from 
ENTSO-E and was scaled up to 2030 according to annual growth estimates contained in the 
European Commission’s report ‘EU energy trends to 2030 update 2009’ (EC, 2009). Wind 
data from 2009 in Ireland, obtained from EirGrid plc, was scaled according to the capacity 
factors in Boccard (2009) and time shifted according to geographical location for the other 
seven European countries. 
The time horizon was set to one year. The start year was set to 2011 and the end year to 
2030. Thus the model was run for twenty one-year time steps. While this means the model 
exhibits myopic expectations, the process of the power system evolution can be seen as a 
consequence of individual investment decisions. 
The 2009 plant mix for each country was provided as the parameter existing_capacity 
(Eurostat, 2011). The 2009 plant mix was selected as it was the most recent date for which 
generation capacity data for all eight countries under study was available. 
Capacity costs for plant and interconnection were taken from the EIA (EIA, 2010) and fuel 
and carbon price projections to 2030 were taken from the IEA New Policies scenario (IEA, 
2011) and converted to a cost per MWh for each type of generation considered.  
Estimates of the value of lost load (VOLL) vary depending on country as well as electricity 
consumer type (Kariuki and Allan, 1996; Leahy and Tol, 2011; de Nooij et al., 2007). For the 
purposes of this study VOLL was set to €10,000 per MWh, the value which was used in the 
Single Irish Electricity Market for 2007/2008 (CER, NIAUR, 2010). 
The current level of interconnection was obtained from ENTSO-E’s Winter 2011 net transfer 
capacity (NTC) figures (ENTSO-E, 2011). A discrepancy exists between the flow on some 
lines, depending on the direction, due to regulatory issues or asymmetries on the line. 
Where a discrepancy existed, the capacity was set to the higher of the two values. This 
implicitly assumes there are no loop flows. 
The default interconnector size was set to 1,000MW in each direction. 1,000MW was chosen 
as a suitable size as most current and planned European interconnectors are of no more 
than 1,000MW. The cost of interconnection per thousand km for a 1,000MW interconnector 
(€1080M) was obtained from EirGrid plc. 
3.2 Case study scenarios 
The model was run for three scenarios. Scenario I is a base case with no targets imposed for 
renewable generation. Scenario II is as Scenario I with a constraint added which requires 
that 20% of the electricity consumed in each individual country be generated from 
renewable sources. Scenario III is as Scenario I with a constraint added which requires that 
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20% of total electricity consumed be generated from renewable sources without including 
targets for individual countries. Scenarios II and III therefore implicitly assume that there is a 
market for renewable obligations as the renewable electricity consumed within a country 
need not have been generated there. Thus the model expands on the approach of  Aune et 
al. (2011) by investigating the effects of interconnection investment on markets for 
renewable obligations. 
In an attempt to isolate the benefits of interconnection each scenario was run under the 
Capacity Optimisation Module only, and under the iterative process between the Capacity 
Optimisation Module (COM) and Interconnection Optimisation Module (IOM). Thus the 
evolution of the total costs could be seen both with and without the opportunity to invest in 
interconnection. 
4 Results 
Interconnection is built under each scenario, but the interconnection portfolio varies 
significantly as the renewable target varies. Figure 2 shows the interconnection built under 
Scenarios I, II and III in solid lines, along with the years in which each interconnector was 
built. The dashed lines represent existing interconnection. 
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(a) Scenario I 
 
(b) Scenario II 
 
(c) Scenario III 
Figure 2: Years in which interconnection investment occur (solid lines); existing interconnection in dashed lines 
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The total costs (in M€) over the twenty years, under each scenario, are given in Table 1, for 
the COM only (no new interconnection) and the full model (COM and IOM): 
 COM & IOM COM 
Scenario I 913,356 914,683 
Scenario II 750,850 753,431 
Scenario III 722,283 739,616 
Table 1: Total costs in M€ over 20 years modelled 
Interconnection reduces total costs in all scenarios, with Scenario III seeing the biggest 
reduction. It should also be noted that the scenarios with a target for renewable electricity 
have lower total costs over the twenty years than with no renewable target. However, the 
capital investment in wind capacity required to bring about this reduction in costs is 
substantial, and thus the model does not invest in wind capacity unless it is required to do so 
by a constraint. This is a consequence of the model’s myopic expectations. 
A major driver of the reduction in costs is the fact that wind generation replaces 
conventional generation, which carries a fuel and carbon cost. The conventional generation 
selected by the model was gas, whose low cost was presumably a principle driver for this. 
The reduction in costs under Scenarios II and III is unrealistically high due to the 
underestimation of the true cost of wind generation, as outlined above. However the 
comparison between the cost figures for interconnection and no interconnection under the 
various scenarios provides insight, as the effects of interconnection under the assumptions 
inherent in the model can be examined. 
While some regions see an increase in generation capacity investment under a scenario that 
allows interconnection investments, total generation capacity decreases under 
interconnection. Scenario I sees total conventional generation capacity investment decrease 
by 8.278GW, Scenario II by 2.047GW and Scenario III by 11.331GW. The difference between 
the reductions in Scenarios II and III highlight the ability of optimal renewable targets and 
interconnection investments to reduce necessary investment in conventional capacity. 
Wind generation is not built under Scenario I. Scenario II sees wind capacity investment in 
most regions, while Scenario III sees a concentration of wind investment in Great Britain and 
Ireland, with some wind investment in France. This is because a total target for all countries 
allows countries with the highest capacity factors for wind (such as Ireland and Great Britain) 
to meet more than 20% of their total electricity demands from renewable sources, thus 
allowing other countries to meet less than 20% of their demand from renewables. Individual 
targets for each country mean that it is cheaper to build renewable generation in countries 
with lower capacity factors as the losses incurred in transmitting electricity from high 
capacity factor countries to countries with a lower capacity factor are sufficiently high to 
mitigate the benefits of investing in countries with the highest capacity factor. The inclusion 
of interconnection reduces total wind capacity investment from 79GW to 77 GW in Scenario 
II, and from 70GW to 68GW in Scenario III. Thus imposing a target for all of the regions 
studied rather than individual targets increases the amount of wind capacity built while 
interconnection decreases the wind capacity investment. 
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The total costs of generation capacity investment, both wind and conventional, are shown in 
Figure 3, while Table 2 delineates the differences in costs observed between the COM only 
and the COM and IOM and the different scenarios. 
 
Figure 3: Total cost of generation investment 
Unit: 100M€ Scenario I Scenario II Scenario III 
Total COM 47.2 126.2 115.8 
Total IOM 45.8 121.0 109.1 
Delta (COM – IOM) 1.432 5.315 6.637 
Delta (scenarios) 0 (baseline) Scen I + 75.2 
Scen I + 63.3 
Scen II – 11.9 
Table 2: Comparisons of total costs (in 100M€) of generation investment  
It can be seen that interconnection reduces investment costs in all scenarios, although the 
reduction is slight. The investment in wind is also lower under Scenario III than in Scenario II, 
as the investment in countries with higher capacity factors allows 20% of generation to 
come from renewables for a smaller amount of wind capacity. The total investments costs 
under Scenario I are significantly lower than in Scenarios II and III, and therefore the 
reduction in overall costs is due to renewable generation displacing conventional generation 
which entails a fuel and carbon cost. 
The Net Present Value (NPV) of allowing interconnection investment in the model can be 
calculated as the discounted stream of net benefits, where the net benefits are given by the 
difference between total costs for each year under a scenario in which interconnection is 
permitted and interconnection is not permitted. The NPV is calculated at discount rates of 
4%, 6% and 8% by equation (8): 
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𝑁𝑃𝑉 = ∑ �𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠(𝑛𝑜 𝑖𝑐)𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 −  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠(𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑖𝑐)𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) ∗ (1 + 𝑖)−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟�𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  ... (8) 
The NPV under each discount rate for each scenario is shown in Figure (4): 
 
Figure 4: NPV of interconnection under each of the three Scenarios considered 
Scenario I at a discount rate of 8% yields a negative NPV for interconnection; in all other 
scenarios the NPV for interconnection is positive. However the NPV is significantly higher 
under Scenario III than Scenarios I or II. This further reinforces the complimentarity between 
interconnection and renewable electricity which is constructed in locations with high 
capacity factors. 
4 Discussion 
The results of the model provide evidence that, subject to the discount rate, interconnection 
is a worthwhile investment, even under a scenario which sees little investment in renewable 
electricity. However it must be noted that the fact that the model minimises total costs 
across all countries , rather than minimising costs on a region-by-region basis, may be a 
strong driver of this interconnection investment. At present, interconnection investment is 
primarily funded by TSOs within a particular country, with some funding available at EU 
level. Unless the cost of interconnection is borne at EU level then each individual 
interconnector must prove beneficial to the consumers within a particular region or 
profitable to a merchant interconnector investor in order for the investment to occur, and 
this may limit investment in interconnection. It is likely that the cost of interconnection 
investment being borne at EU level will not happen until there is a fully integrated EU 
15 
market for electricity, or at the very least until a greater amount of these investment 
decisions are determined at EU rather than national level. 
The model can identify which of the potential drivers of interconnection discussed in the 
introduction (integration of renewable generation, smoothing of demand profiles and thus 
reduction of investment in generation capacity) are found to have an effect in determining 
interconnection investment. (Mitigation of market power is also a potential driver of 
interconnection investment; however the model does not consider markets and so cannot 
shed light on this issue). There is little evidence in the results to indicate that demand 
smoothing is sufficiently beneficial to prompt investment in interconnection. While there is 
some decrease in generation capacity investment when interconnection is allowed (Figure 
3), this effect is marginal under Scenario I, where only thermal capacity is built. The decrease 
in wind capacity when interconnection is included (Scenarios II and III) is much more 
pronounced. Thus it appears that it is primarily factors on the supply side, rather than the 
demand side, which drive the observed investment in interconnection. The increased value 
of interconnection when renewable targets are imposed further suggests that supply factors 
dominate when determining the value of interconnection. 
The reduction in costs that is seen as a result of allowing interconnection investment is 
greater under Scenario II than Scenario I. This suggests that wind investment and 
interconnector investment are complimentary. Despite the fact that investment in wind 
generation occurs in nearly all regions under Scenario II, there is sufficient variation in the 
demand and wind time series to allow some export and import of wind generation, which 
reduces dependence on conventional generation. However the individual targets for each 
region cause regions with lower wind capacity factors to invest in wind generation, which 
displaces a lower amount of conventional generation than in a region with a higher capacity 
factor. 
It is clear from Scenario III that the complimentarity of wind and interconnection can be best 
exploited when there is a common target for renewable generation across all regions 
studied. This allows those regions with higher capacity factors to invest in wind generation 
and reduce total investment in generation capacity across all regions modelled. 
In light of the results presented in this paper it would appear that specific targets for 
renewable energy consumption for each individual country across Europe are not optimal, 
for electricity generation at least. In this respect this model confirms the findings of Aune et 
al. (2011) and finds that they hold even when interconnection expansion is considered. The 
most cost-effective way of meeting these targets is to invest in renewable generation in 
regions with a high capacity factors and to interconnect to those regions. However in 
practise the individual targets currently in place for each country are inducing countries in 
Europe to invest in renewable generation within their own country, even if they may not 
have the best capacity factor. The model results provide strong evidence that this process 
will not achieve the least costly outcome for a given renewable target. 
16 
5 Conclusion 
This paper presented an optimisation model which can be used to determine optimal 
interconnection investment between regions for a given set of inputs. These inputs include 
hourly demand, the existing generation portfolio, the existing interconnection portfolio, fuel 
and generation capital costs and interconnection investment costs. The model can include 
constraints which require a certain amount of electricity to be generated from renewable 
sources. The model determines optimal generation and interconnection capacity in an 
iterative process on an annual basis. 
The model was run as a case study for eight Northern European countries under three 
scenarios, one in which there was no target for renewable generation, one with a target for 
each individual country and one with a total target for all countries modelled. It was found 
that interconnection investment reduces total costs under every scenario, with the biggest 
reduction occurring under the scenario in which there is one total target for renewable 
generation, rather than specific targets for each individual country. The results suggest that 
current European policy, which seeks to increase interconnection across Europe as well as 
increase renewable generation in each country, is not optimal, as the full value of 
interconnection will not be realised with each country investing in variable renewable 
generation on an individual basis. 
Appendix 
Interconnection investments undertaken in each of the three scenarios are outlined below, 
with existing interconnection given in italics. 
 IE GB FR BE NL LU DE DK 
IE  0.95 
1GW(2011) 
      
GB 0.95 
1GW(2011) 
 2  1    
FR  2  3.4   3.2  
BE   3.4  2.4    
NL  1  2.4   3.85 1GW(2011) 
LU       0.98  
DE   3.2  3.85 0.98  1.5 
1GW(2011) 
1GW(2013) 
DK     1GW(2011)  1.5 
1GW(2011) 
1GW(2013) 
 
Table 3: Interconnection built under Scenario I 
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 IE GB FR BE NL LU DE DK 
IE  0.95       
GB 0.95  2 1GW(2017) 
1GW(2030) 
1    
FR  2  3.4 
1GW(2017) 
  3.2  
BE  1GW(2017) 
1GW(2030) 
3.4 
1GW(2017) 
 2.4 1GW(2011)   
NL  1  2.4   3.85  
LU    1GW(2011)   0.98  
DE   3.2  3.85 0.98  1.5 
1GW(2028) 
DK       1.5 
1GW(2028) 
 
Table 4: Interconnection built under Scenario II 
 
 IE GB FR BE NL LU DE DK 
IE  0.95 
1GW(2012) 
      
GB 0.95 
1GW(2012) 
 2 
1GW(2015) 
1GW(2017) 
 1    
FR  2 
1GW(2015) 
1GW(2017) 
 3.4 
1GW(2015) 
  3.2  
BE   3.4 
1GW(2015) 
 2.4    
NL  1  2.4   3.85  
LU       0.98  
DE   3.2  3.85 0.98  1.5 
1GW(2017) 
DK       1.5 
1GW(2017) 
 
Table 5: Interconnection built under Scenario III 
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